RECENT CASES

INTER-COUNT REFERENCE ON MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
THE ILLINOIS PRACTICE ACT
The plaintiff had undertaken to supply refrigerator tool kits to the Navy,
and the defendant sub-contracted to pack them. The first of the three counts in
the complaint alleged an erroneous duplicate payment for some of the first kits
packed. The second count set forth a breach of contract and waiver under
duress. The third described a contract termination settlement in which the
plaintiff paid allegedly excessive charges under duress; the settlement included
a credit item for duplicate payment. The defendant's motion to dismiss was
sustained by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the
second and third counts did not state facts sufficient to constitute duress and
that the credit item alleged in count three must defeat the plaintiff's claim for
duplicate payment in count one. Fred C. Kramer Company, Inc. v. Hebard
Storage Warehouses,Inc.'
By setting forth in the third count the termination settlement containing the
credit item, the plaintiff unavoidably anticipated a defense of accord and
satisfaction to his claim in the first count for money paid under mistake. Yet the
same showing of duress which was necessary to the plaintiff's recovery in the
third count would also negative the defense. Hence the court took the view that
unless the plaintiff could win on the issue of duress he must lose on both the
first and third counts.2 By relating the third count to the first in this manner,
however, the court violated the common-law rule of pleading that a count,
which must state a complete cause of action, can not be supported or attacked
by matter set forth in other counts if not specifically referred to.3 Application
1 336 Ill. App. 15o, 82 N.E. 2d 832 (1948).

A

2 Apart from the fact that separate counts are used and the non-reference rule is therefore

involved, as discussed below, the court appears to have violated the common-law pleading
rule that anticipated defenses and matter related thereto are surplusage and cannot be taken
advantage of by the defendant on demurrer. Lesher v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
239 Ill. 502, 88 N.E. 208 (igog). The equity practice, on the other hand, held that the demurrer
would be sustained unless the original or amended bill controverted such defense. Gunton v.
Hughes, 18i li. 132, 54 N .E. 895 (1899); Eldridge v. Pierce, 9oIll. 474 (x878). Although the
Civil Practice Act mergeslegal and equitable systems of pleading, fll. Rev. Stat. (i947) c. 110,
§ 155, it remains silent on the question of which of these two particular rules shall prevail. The
equity rule has been recommended by Clark as the better practice under the codes. Clark
Code Pleading 252 (1947). Further, the equity rule has been adopted by the Act for the defense of the statute of limitations, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. rio, § 172 (f), and by the courts to
the extent that a reply is held not to be necessary where the allegations of the complaint
sufficiently meet the defense raised in the defendant's answer. In re Braun's Estate, 330 Ill.
App. 322, 71 N.E. 2d 364 (i947); Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan & Building Ass'n., 3 10 Ill.
App. 465, 34 N.E. 2d 736 (1941); City of Flora v. Bryden, 300 Ill. App. 1, 21 N.E. 2d 323
(1939). By following the equity rule the instant court decided the substantive issues and
avoided further pleadings, in keeping with the goal of the Act. Il. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. rIo
§ 128.
: Ross v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 225 III. App. 633 (1922); Porter v. Drennan, 13 Ill. App.
362 (1883); Burnap v. Dennis, 3 Scam. (4 II.) 478 (1842); 41 Am. Jur. 365 (1942); 3 Cyc.
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of this rule would have required the court to find the first count good against
the motion to dismiss, because on its face it stated a complete cause of action.4
The court would then have either granted the defendant leave to answer, or
ordered a trial. Either of these alternatives, however, would eventually present
the same issue of law which faced the instant court when it departed from the
common-law non-reference rule. 5 By sidestepping that rule the court was able
to pass on the substantive merits of the case, while avoiding the delay and
expense of further proceedings. 6
The Illinois Civil Practice Act and Rules 7 make no mention of the commonlaw non-reference rule. Consequently, whether the court was justified in abrogating the rule in the instant case can only be decided by considering the development of the rule and its place in the modern practice. Counts were first
used to join in one complaint controversies that previously had formed the
basis of separate lawsuits.8 The non-reference rule probably first functioned
as a guarantee that no prejudice would result from the joinder of a bad claim
with a good one. Later, pleaders began to state in separate counts what was
essentially the same controversy, preserving, however, the fiction that each
count actually referred to a different set of facts. 9 This practice developed
because the pleader might be uncertain of his facts or of the theory on which
recovery could be had. Yet he could not plead duplicitously by stating in one
count more than one ground sufficient to support the relief sought,10 nor could
he set forth alternative allegations." Yet by pleading only one version of his
(19o9); i Chitty's Treatise on Pleading 429 (7th Eng. ed., 16th Am. ed., 1879). Contra:
Lake Shore &Michigan Southern Ry. v.Hessions, 1So Il. 546,37 N.E. 905 (1894).
4 Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 37, Ill. 412, 21 N.E. 2d 294 (1939) (a motion to
dismiss will not be sustained if there are one or more good counts).
5The defendant's answer would allege the credit as accord and satisfaction, and the
plaintiff would reply with allegations of duress. The same issues of the credit and duress would
be developed at a trial.
6Compare the line of California cases holding that where a complaint contains both a
special count and a common count based on the same set of facts, and the special count is
held insufficient in law, the common count must fail. Orloff v.Metropolitan Trust Co., 17 Cal.
2d 484, XO P. 2d 396 (1941); Fruns v. Albertsworth, 71 Cal. App. 2d 318, x62 p. 2d 666
(1945); Hays v. Temple, 23 Cal. App.. 2d 69o 73 P. 2d 1248 (I937); see Note, 30 Calif. L.
Rev. 585 (1942).
7flI. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 110, §§ 125-259.
8Second Report by the Commissioners on the Practice and Proceedings of the Superior
Courts of Common Law 35 (Parlt., i83o).
9The tenacity of this fiction is indicated by the advice to the pleader given by both Stephen
and Chitty that he refer in later counts to "other" goods and to "the further sum." Stephen, A
Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions 261 (3rd Am. ed. from 2nd London ed.,
igOI); i Chitty's Treatise on Pleading 429 (7 th Eng. ed., 16th Am. ed., I879).
10Stephen, op. cit. supra note 9,at 242.
" Stephen, op. cit. supra note 9,at 339; Chitty, op. cit. supra note 9,at 26o. In one sense
duplicitous allegations are alternative because only one is necessary to support the relief
asked. See McCaskill, Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated 104 (1933). However, "alternative"
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claim, he risked dismissal if the trial developed the slightest variance between
pleading and proof.' 2 Consequently, he sought protection by stating the possible
variations of his claim in separate counts. The non-reference rule thus served a
second function: that of assuring the pleader that the rules against duplicitous
and alternative pleadings would not apply as though he had set forth everything in one count.' s
The common-law non-reference rule would not have performed either of the
two functions in the instant case. When the plaintiff stated and negatived in
the third count a defense to the claim in the first, he did not plead duplicitous
or alternative statements of one cause of action. Nor did he set forth separate
causes of action, since a different result would not have occurred if he had
brought a separate action for duplicate payment alone. The defendant's allegation of the credit, and the plaintiff's reply of duress, would then have presented
the same issues of law on the pleadings as in the instant case, with the same
result. The plaintiff would be in a still worse position if he had first brought an
action to set aside the termination settlement for duress, because an adverse
14
judgment would probably bar a later action for duplicate payment.
The strongest argument in favor of preserving the non-reference rule in
Illinois is that it protects the pleader from a careless court. For example, in the
instant case the court ignored the plaintiff's contention that the credit item did
not relate to the claim set forth in the first count.' 5 This issue of fact might
have received closer attention either at trial or on the pleadings if the defendant had been required to plead over to the first count. Moreover, although
the Act expressly protects "alternative" allegations,' 8 there is uncertainty in
the scope of the term. Under the non-reference rule a pleader could gain added
shelter from an undiscriminating court by stating his alternative allegations in
separate counts.
An examination of the Act and Rules, however, indicates that the non-reference rule is obsolete, if not abolished, in the modern practice. Variance is not a
is normally used to describe "mutually exclusive" statements of fact, theories of recovery, or
prayers for relief. See Boyd v. New York & H. R. Co., 220 Fed. 174, 179 (D.C. N.Y., 9 s);
but see Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings, 33 Yale L.J. 365, 376 (1924).
12 Buckley v. Mandel Bros., 333 Ill. 368, 164 N.E. 657 (r928) (judgment for plaintiff in
negligence action reversed where declaration alleged that defendant's truck "ran into" decedent's motorcycle and proof at trial showed that decedent's motorcycle ran into defendant's
truck).
13 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 9, at 261; 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 305 (1938).
14If the court decides that the "same" cause of action is involved, the prior adjudication
will bar the later action on principles of res judicata; if the court decides that "different"
causes of action are involved, the prior judgment will at least be conclusive on the issue of
duress, under the collateral estoppel doctrine. See Barry v. The Commonwealth Edison Co.,
3 74 Ill. 4 73 , 29 N.E. 2d xo4 (1940).
15 In support of this contention it should be noted that the amount of duplicate payment
was alleged to be $1,456.oo., whereas the credit was only for $596.69.
16ll. Rev. Stat. (1947) C. io, § 167 (2).
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problem because there are liberal provisions for amendment to conform the
pleadings to the proof. 1 7 Duplicity is no longer fatal.18 Alternative allegations' 9
and prayers for relief 20 are expressly protected by the Act. Many provisions of
the Act and Rules give a reduced significance to the common-law conception
of the "cause of action" and its pleading container, the count. 21 The inflated
use of multiple counts is in disfavor.2 2 Lastly, the Act expresses a definite policy
of shortening trial litigation and eliminating pleading technicalities wherever
23
p9ssible, while continuing to do justice to all the interested parties.
The abolition of the non-reference rule can benefit plaintiffs as well as
defendants. A situation might arise in which a necessary averment has been
inadvertently omitted from one count but is present in another.2 4 To permit the
trial or appellate court to supply the missing averment would work no prejudice
of surprise to the defendant, and would be in line with the provisions of the
Act which permit liberal amendment by the trial25 and appellate courts, 26 and
which hold that objections not made at the trial cannot be raised on appeal. 27

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS IN ILLINOIS
The law relating to the establishment of easements by prescription generally
requires the claimant of the easement to show that his use of another's land
was open, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period,
17Ibid., at § 170 (3).
is Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n., 3 14 Ill. App. 244,41 N.E. 2d 314 (1942); Kovar v.
Bremer, 281 Ill. App. 5c5 (1935), rev'd on other grounds 294 Ill. App. 225, 13 N.E. 2d 656
(1938).

19 1. Rev. Stat. (I947) C.iio, § 167
20Ibid., at § Y58.

(2).

21111. Rev. Stat. (i947) c. 11o, § 148 (3) (alternative claims against different defendants
permitted in the same or separate counts); ibid., at § 167 (2) (alternate statements of fact permitted in the same or separate counts); ibid., at §§ 259.Io, 259.I1 (certain equitable and legal
matter permitted in one count or in separate counts); ibid., at § 259.X2 (different breaches of
the same duty "growing out of the same transaction, or based on the same set of facts" permitted in one count, as well as in separate counts).
21 See Fisher, The Persistence of Chitty, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 359 (I939).
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. (i947) C. 1o, § 128 ("This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that
controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the
parties.. . ."); ibid., at §§ 182a, 259.23a (pre-trial procedure); ibid., at §§ i8i, 259.A6 (summary judgments).
24 Compare, Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 9o5
(I894), where an allegation of survival of widow and next of kin appearing in the seventh
count was held to apply to the first six counts, which charged different items of negligence.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. (i947) c. 110 § 170.
26Ibid., at § 216 (a).

27

Ibid., at § i66 (3).

